Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence : theory and evidence /

Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Cukierman, Alex
Format: Livre
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Cambridge : MIT, c1992.
Sujets:
Banco.
Banco Central.
Table des matières:
  • 1. Introduction.
  • 2. Overview of parte I.
  • 3. The employment motive for monetary expansión.
  • 4. The revenue motive for monetary expansión.
  • 5. The mercantilistic or balance of payments motive for monetary expansión.
  • 6. Comparison of policy outcomes under s system of adjustable pegs with outcomes under a commonly managed currency system and its consequences for european monetary unification.
  • 7. The financial stability motive, interest rate smoothing, and the theory of optimal seigniorage.
  • 8. Overview of models of monetary policy with private information.
  • 9. The employment motive in the presence of a minimal information advantage about objetives.
  • 10. Na extended information advantage about central bank objectives.
  • 11. Alternative notions of credibility and reputation.
  • 12. The politically optimal level of ambiguity.
  • 13. Private information about Money demand and credibility.
  • 14. Partial disclosure of policy and its effect on policy outcomes.
  • 15. Why does inflation persist? Theories of monetary accommodation and of inflation cyclicality under discretion.
  • 16. Signaling and prívate information about the ability to commit and abou objectives with time invariant types.
  • 17. Political parties and monetary policy.
  • 18. Aspects of central bank independence and their impacto n policy outcomes and the distribution of inflation.
  • 19. The measurement of central bank independence.
  • 20. Inflation and central bank independence.
  • 21. Ranking of central bank by na overall índex of inflation based cental bank independence.
  • 22. The mean and the variance of inflation, central bank credit, and central bank indpendence.
  • 23. The determinants of central bank independence.

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