Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence : theory and evidence /
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
MIT,
c1992.
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| Materias: |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. Introduction.
- 2. Overview of parte I.
- 3. The employment motive for monetary expansión.
- 4. The revenue motive for monetary expansión.
- 5. The mercantilistic or balance of payments motive for monetary expansión.
- 6. Comparison of policy outcomes under s system of adjustable pegs with outcomes under a commonly managed currency system and its consequences for european monetary unification.
- 7. The financial stability motive, interest rate smoothing, and the theory of optimal seigniorage.
- 8. Overview of models of monetary policy with private information.
- 9. The employment motive in the presence of a minimal information advantage about objetives.
- 10. Na extended information advantage about central bank objectives.
- 11. Alternative notions of credibility and reputation.
- 12. The politically optimal level of ambiguity.
- 13. Private information about Money demand and credibility.
- 14. Partial disclosure of policy and its effect on policy outcomes.
- 15. Why does inflation persist? Theories of monetary accommodation and of inflation cyclicality under discretion.
- 16. Signaling and prívate information about the ability to commit and abou objectives with time invariant types.
- 17. Political parties and monetary policy.
- 18. Aspects of central bank independence and their impacto n policy outcomes and the distribution of inflation.
- 19. The measurement of central bank independence.
- 20. Inflation and central bank independence.
- 21. Ranking of central bank by na overall índex of inflation based cental bank independence.
- 22. The mean and the variance of inflation, central bank credit, and central bank indpendence.
- 23. The determinants of central bank independence.